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Abstract
Senate ratification of the New START treaty re-established effective
bilateral inspection and monitoring of American and Russian nuclear
holdings and has the potential to further enhance U.S.-Russian
cooperation on key issues, including containing the Iranian nuclear
program, and further reductions in the two countries' arsenals. Although
the accord was widely heralded as a foreign policy success of the Obama
administration, the contentious Senate ratification may impede future
progress on arms control.

Introduction
On April 8, 2010, President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev signed a new strategic offensive arms agreement to replace the
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expired in
December 2009.1 Although the replacement accord (termed New START)
enjoyed support from current U.S. military leaders and a bevy of Republican national security veterans and was ultimately passed by the U.S. Senate on December 22, 2010, "no other Russian-American arms control
treaty that was ultimately ratified ever generated as much opposition on
the final vote."2 This article will detail New START's principal numerical
limits and its monitoring measures, outline Republican concerns vis-à-vis
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the new accord and steps taken by the Obama administration to assuage
these, and assess the prospects of further arms control in the wake of New
START.

New START Provisions and Verification Measures
Under New START, the United States and Russia are limited to 1,550
deployed strategic nuclear warheads on no more than 800 deployed and
non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—a steep cut from START
I levels, which permitted each side 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery
vehicles or launchers.3 The New START limit on deployed strategic warheads is 30 percent lower than the warhead ceiling of 2,200 set by the
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or Moscow Treaty).
The warhead limit covers those deployed on intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), as well as counting each heavy bomber equipped with nuclear
armaments as carrying only one warhead.
New START utilizes a different approach to counting warheads than
START I. While the 1991 treaty used a type-attribution counting rule that
assigned each ballistic missile type a number of warheads, the new accord
uses an actual-load counting rule. The latter approach is preferable
because it allows both sides to deploy different numbers of warheads on
the same type of missile, providing greater flexibility for each side to
determine its force structure while remaining in compliance with the
treaty.
Under New START, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments are
counted as carrying one nuclear warhead each, because it is currently neither Russian nor American operational practice to maintain nuclear
weapons aboard heavy bombers (in contrast to the warheads deployed on
ICBMs and SLBMs). Moreover, the American belief that heavy bombers
are the least destabilizing leg of the strategic triad influenced the counting
rule. In contrast to START I, the new treaty's limits will not apply to heavy
bombers and submarines not equipped with nuclear armaments. Nevertheless, New START does contain inspection provisions to assure the Russians that these weapons platforms no longer have a nuclear role.
Although the new accord has a full set of verification measures, Presidents
Obama and Medvedev agreed last July to streamline monitoring provisions. New START includes provisions that prohibit each side from interfering with the other's national technical means of verification (for
instance, satellites) and requires Moscow and Washington to exchange
70
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and regularly update data on certain characteristics of their strategic
forces. Reduced access to Russian telemetry was of concern to Republican
Senators in debating whether to back the accord (START I mandated that
all telemetry be shared). Despite assurances by senior American officials,
including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that the U.S. does not need
access to Russian telemetry to ensure Moscow's compliance with the
treaty, some Senators believed that the new accord would weaken preexisting verification provisions. To assuage these concerns, the Obama
administration negotiated access to telemetric data from up to five ballistic missile tests annually.4 Russian negotiators were hesitant to provide
the access because Washington stands to gain much more information
from Russia's ongoing tests of the Bulava SLBM and the Topol-M ICBM
currently under development than Moscow does from observing American Minutemen III and Trident D-5 launches, which Russia has already
observed for many years.5
The treaty establishes two types of inspection: Type One inspections,
which will take place at ICBM, submarine, and air bases (up to 10 per
year), and Type Two inspections which will occur at ICBM loading facilities, test ranges, training ranges, and formerly declared facilities (up to
eight annually).6 One of the major purposes of Type One inspections is to
confirm the number of warheads on a deployed ICBM or SLBM.

New START Ratification: Republican Concerns and
Administration Responses
The Senate debate and the ensuing resolution to ratify the New START
treaty reflected Senators' concerns about three issues in particular: Russian opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defenses, Russian concerns about U.S. long-range conventional strike weapons, and U.S.
concerns about Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Despite seven
months of deliberations on the New START accord, including eighteen
hearings and approximately 1,000 written answers to questions, objections, and concerns from Senators, the treaty was finally approved after a
cloture vote largely along party lines (71–26).7
Republicans, led by Senator John Kyl (AZ), made clear that their support
of New START would depend, among other things, on sufficient funding
being provided for the maintenance and modernization of the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex. These conditions were codified in Section 1251
of the FY2010 defense appropriation bill, drafted by Senator Kyl. Section
1251 required "a comprehensive plan to (1) maintain delivery platforms;
(2) sustain a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and
71
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(3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex."8 In order to fulfill this
requirement, the Obama administration promised, when it submitted
New START to the Senate for ratification on May 13, 2010, that the
United States "will invest well over $100 billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize some strategic systems" and "invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize
the nuclear weapons complex," beginning with a $7 billion request for
FY2011, a 10 percent increase over FY2010.9 When some Republican Senators deemed the proposed funding level insufficient, the administration
submitted an update to the Section 1251 report in November 2010, detailing an intention to request $600 million more for the nuclear weapons
complex in 2012 than had been stated in the plan submitted in May. Not
surprisingly, the directors of the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories
were "very pleased" with the updated figures, although the extent of the
necessary refurbishment programs is debatable.10
Republican Senators also sought to ensure that the accord did not interfere with the ability of the United States to develop and deploy missile
defenses. Specifically, the Senators pushed to eliminate language from the
treaty's non-binding preamble, to the effect that there exists an undefined
"interrelationship" between strategic offensive and defensive systems.
This initiative was defeated only after President Obama wrote to the Senators on December 18, 2010 and pledged to "fully deploy all available missile defense systems, including those against ICBMs."11
Yet a third concern among the Senators was the accord's treatment of
long-range conventional strike weapons. In response to Russian worries
that such weapons—especially if mounted on ICBMs—could serve as a
first-strike capability and endanger Russia's ability to respond with a second-strike, Washington conceded that this type of weapon would be
counted within overall treaty limits. The Senators attempted to amend the
treaty to ensure that this concession would not prevent deployment of
such systems. A December 20, 2010 letter to Senators from Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen helped to defeat the
amendment proposal. (Any amendments to the text of the treaty were
viewed as "treaty killers" because they would require re-negotiation with
Russia.)
A final concern of Republican Senators opposed to the ratification of New
START was the lack of a provision in the treaty text regarding TNWs, an
area in which Russia enjoys considerable numerical superiority. Although
TNWs are not regulated by New START or any other arms control
agreement, had the Senate failed to ratify New START, a future RussianAmerican negotiation on TNWs would have proven difficult. In fact, to
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placate the concerned parties, the Obama administration made a
commitment to address the issue in the next round of negotiations, slated
to begin within one year of New START's entry into force—a difficult,
though achievable, proposition.12 Ultimately, although the Senate ratified
the New START treaty, an accomplishment that most—though not all—
observers hailed as major foreign policy success of the Obama
administration,13 numerous potential obstacles remain to realizing the
full scope of the administration's disarmament agenda.

The Response in Moscow
Immediately after learning of the ratification of the New START accord,
President Medvedev commended the U.S. Senate on the achievement.
However, Medvedev warned that members of the Russian Duma and Federation Council (the lower and upper chambers of the Russian Parliament, respectively) would have to delay endorsement of the accord until
they could verify that Washington's ratification text had not altered the
text of the treaty.14 Although the Duma initially intended to time its ratification of the accord to coincide with that of the U.S. Senate, upon learning
of the amendments made by U.S. Senators to the ratification protocol,
Duma members announced that to pass New START would require three
rounds of voting. Like their counterparts in Washington, Russian parliamentarians submitted additions to the ratification document, but with the
opposite intent.15 Although New START passed the first vote in the Duma
(350–58), lawmakers adopted five amendments and two statements on
the accord's ratification during the second ratification vote on January
14.16 Specifically:
"[T]he chamber incorporated in its ratification text various stipulations on the pact's implementation, including conditions that
could prompt Moscow to stop participating in the pact and a call
for the Kremlin to plan updates to Russia's strategic deterrent.
Russia would also reserve the right to withdraw from the treaty if
the United States breaches the pact, if Moscow deems future U.S.
missile shield deployments to pose an unacceptable strategic risk,
or if Washington prepares strategic conventional armaments
without permission from a Bilateral Consultative Commission."17
While some observers discount these developments, pointing out that the
accord has already been signed by both the American and Russian presidents, others contend they have the potential to sidetrack President
Obama's disarmament agenda.18
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Conclusion: Prospects Moving Forward
With the bilateral ratification of New START complete, the United States
and Russia will need to discuss, and hopefully come to agreement, on a
variety of other pressing arms control issues not limited to: Bilateral
reductions in TNWs, ratification and signature of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, and the challenge posed by non-deployed strategic warheads.
The lukewarm support received by the New START accord in the Senate
(previous arms control treaties have typically been approved with 80 to
90 votes in favor), the widespread—but erroneous—notion that Moscow
did not make any concessions in the recently concluded negotiations, and
the uncertainty surrounding President Obama's re-election next year may
make Moscow hesitate to engage in further negotiations.19 Although serious talks on any of the above-mentioned issues are unlikely to begin until
early 2013, very cautious preliminary discussions could commence as
early as next spring.20
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